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Introduction .
1% July 22, 1994, President Clmton announced that the L S would contnbute massrve rehef assrstance to the Rwandan refugees in response to an appeal from the Umted sahons I&h
Comnussloner for Refugees The U S support would be provlded pnmanly by the nuhtary The
Defense Department qu&ly responded, and almost all observers have commended rt for quxk action that saved thousands of hves The subsequent decision to have the U S nuhtary mthdraw from the Rwanda regon &d not, however, flow dxectly from the comnutments made by the Presldeflt and lus Nahonal Secunty A&er m July For that analysis, one needs to look at the d&re?t perspectxves of the orgamzahons mvolved and at how the Defense Department was able to use fFe nxhtary cham of command to serve its purposes
The State Department and the Agency for Internauonal Development, facmg a humamtarlan emergency of unprecedented magmtude, saw the srtuahon m the Rwanda area as unstable and mere reluctant to prematurely declare the cnsls to be over From thex perspectxve, it was nnportant for the U S to keep the President's comnutment to support LXWCR To understand the perspectwe of the Defense Department, on the other hand, it is useful to keep q mind that tasks whxh run counter to an orgamzahon's tradtional goals tend to meet res&&ce The Pentagon viewed nulitary support for the humanitanan rehef operahon as somethmg which was not its normal function particularly since there was no security component invoked Many military supporters further argued that such an operation would undercut the ultimate purpose of the nulitary, to sght and win the nation's wars The m&ary concentrated on stopping the dying and then quxkly turning the operation over to ctian relief agencies.
It therefore is understandable that the decision to terminate the miliw operation by Septerpber 30 was the subject of bureaucratic politics between the Defense Department on one Lange 6
From the mthtary perspecttve, thchorst was over and it would soon be tune for an expedtuous transfer to rehef agencies In mid-July, Zarre had wrtnessed one of the Rorst humamtarian crises nnagmable up to 800,000 refugees had crossed the border m the course of four days and arrrved m a remote area of volcamc rock wtth msufIicrent water and food, almost 50,000 refugees (between 6 and 10%) dred durmg the first month after the mflux By the second month' however, "a well-coordmated rehef programme was associated wrth a steep de&e m death rates" to one-fourth of the earher level (Goma Group, 339-342) The U S mrhtary, ~th its unmatched logtshcai capabrhty, had provrded the necessary "surge capacity" whrch mternahonal relief agencies lacked for a crrsrs on such a massive scale As one Defense Department official mvolved m the operahon put it. once the dying stopped and the infrastructure was estabhshed, "our mrsaon was over" and resources whrch had been dtverted to Gperahon Support Hope could be apphed to "more appropnate tasks " In hts Mew, "the mhtary dxdn't percerve this as a true rntssrori" because there was no sect&y factor involved (Pentagon official)
The crvrhan agencies, however, had a Werent outlook They were accustomed to deahng Rilth refugee and nugrahon crrses, but thts was one of the worst m history It seemed less and less hkely that the refugees (pnmarrly Hutus) would to return to Rwanda anytnne soon Extremists, many of whom had comnntted genocide, were hvmg in the refugee camps Meanwhtle, Rwanda itself had been devastated by the horn& genocide and the government takeover by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (led by Tut&s). The prospects for further conflict appeared to be high. Durmg the second month of the cnsis, 5 to 8 refugees out of every 10,000 were dying each day, and this was still wdy above the crude mortahty rate (0 6 per 10,000 per day) m Rwanda prior to the conflict (Gomd Group 340). Thus, from the perspectrve of State and USAID (and many nongovernmental organtzations), this looked to be a long-term situation requrrmg large-scale humanitarian and development resources and an extraordinary commitment on the part of the international community. Given this context' they saw it as important that the U S. Government meet rts July policy commitment to provide four of the "service packages" requested by UNHCR.
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They also beheved that the departure of the mrhtary should take place only after certam standards were met (such as the generally-accepted figure for hters of water needed per person per day m a humamtarran emergency), and that there should be a seamless transihon as the nuhtary departed
In thts view, it was tmportant to look obJectrvely at the situahon on the ground rather than sunply "deGne the crrsis as over so the mshtaty could leave" (Refugee officral)
By the latter half of .4ugust, an addihonal factor, fumimg, became more promment m the Two days later, a news report citing U S. and internahonal rehef officials crrhcrzed the Defense Department's organizational response to the President's commitments in July:
The discrepancy between the mte House's promrses and the Pentagon's performance was due to a combination of the admimstration's reluctance to m&t that the mihtary meet each UN. task and the mihtary's judgment that the tasks were either too costly, too risky or unnecessary. . [The projected end-September withdrawal] is earlier than some U S. diplomats and many mtemational relief workers favor. Moreover, the military plans to depart after performing only a Lange 9
portron of the four prrncrpal human&u-ran task that SahonaJ Secumy ,4dvxer
.4nthony Lake and other sensor officials m July pledged pubhcly tt would under&he 
